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Abstract 
Even after two decades of research on globalization, we still face open questions about 
the interplay between national capitalist institutions and transnational economic gov-
ernance. How does embeddedness into transnational institutions influence national 
capitalist orders? How do national capitalist patterns influence transnational economic 
governance? The central suggestion of this paper is that the traditional divide between 
Comparative and International Political Economy has to be overcome in order to ad-
dress these questions in a more thorough way. More specifically, it calls for combining 
Comparative Capitalism with institutionalist approaches within International Political 
Economy. The paper illustrates the mutually complementary character of both perspec-
tives by looking at selected empirical examples.
Zusammenfassung
Auch nach zwei Dekaden der Globalisierungsforschung sind viele Fragen über die Wech-
selwirkung zwischen nationalen kapitalistischen Institutionen und transnationalen 
Wirt schaftsordnungen noch ungelöst. Wie beeinflusst die Einbettung in transnationale 
Institutionen nationale Ausprägungen des Kapitalismus? Wie formen Muster des Kapi-
talismus auf nationaler Ebene die transnationale Wirtschaftsordnung? Das vorliegende 
Papier argumentiert, dass die traditionelle Trennung zwischen Vergleichender und In-
ternationaler Politischer Ökonomie (IPÖ) überwunden werden muss, um diese Fragen 
gründlicher bearbeiten zu können. Es wird insbesondere vorgeschlagen, transnational-
institutionalistische IPÖ-Perspektiven mit dem Theorieprogramm der Vergleichenden 
Kapitalismusforschung zu verknüpfen. Das Papier demonstriert den komplementären 
Charakter der beiden Perspektiven an ausgewählten empirischen Beispielen.
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Transnational Economic Order and National Economic 
Institutions: Comparative Capitalism Meets International 
Political Economy
1 Introduction
Recent developments have demonstrated that the global South has lost its formerly 
peripheral role within the development of capitalism. A major economic stimulus pro-
gram announced by the Chinese government was among the few events which was 
able to temporarily uplift global stock exchanges in November 2008. Shortly afterwards, 
although a program addressing the global financial crisis had not even been discussed 
within the established G7/G8 setting, the issue was taken up by the G20, which com-
prises the most important governments of the South. Even more recently, the surprising 
German economic boom was primarily caused by strong exports to China and other 
emerging economies. Today, the triad regions (i.e., Japan, the United States, and West-
ern Europe) only produce half of all global goods and services, while the remainder of 
these stems from the “developing” and “transitional” economies of the periphery, with 
those economies making up continuously increasing shares over the last twenty-five 
years (Goldberg 2009: 23). The definition of what constitutes “core” and “periphery” 
has increasingly been cast into doubt, on the one hand by the rising economic centrality 
of China, but on the other by increasing worries about the downturn in the European 
periphery, the notorious “PIIGS” (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) as well 
as Belgium. These developments have considerable repercussions for our understand-
ing of “globalization” and its impact on the capitalist economies we live in. Some years 
ago, by contrast, it was possible to analyze the development of capitalism through a 
rather exclusive focus on the triad. Other economies were rather weak, with the tempo-
rary exception of the Soviet Union. Thus, it was safely possible to relegate the study of 
the global periphery to area specialists or the Development Studies community. These 
times are over. Moreover, the former periphery is increasingly intervening into the core, 
as indicated, for example, by the strongly growing number of acquisitions of German 
companies by Indian multinationals – which have tripled since 2004 and are soon ex-
pected to number some 30 to 50 cases annually1 – and the recent legislative activity to 
control the activities of sovereign wealth funds. In a way, we can call these develop-
ments a second phase of globalization, and for most (Western) societies this might be 
a more challenging phase than the first one. Although the process is still unfolding, it 
raises important questions about changes in the interplay between transnational and 
Parts of this paper draw on co-authored work with Heather Taylor, Arjan Vliegenthart, and Angela 
Wigger. I am also indebted to Martin Höpner and Cornelia Woll for highly useful comments on a 
previous version and to Mary Dobrian for most helpful language revisions. 
1 According to an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 2, 2009, p. 16.
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national capitalist orders: How do changing patterns of transnational economic order 
(e.g., increasing levels of foreign direct investment or shifts between public and private 
governance) influence established national capitalist institutions? And how will newly 
emerging national capitalist patterns (e.g., in China or India) influence transnational 
economic governance in the future?
Today, any comprehensive understanding of this interplay cannot be restricted to the 
simple comparative study of triad economies. The regulatory framework that is being 
designed in cooperation between the triad economies and the global South must also 
be taken into account. Still, Western Europe, the US and Japan have been the sole fo-
cus of the “Comparative Capitalism” (Jackson/Deeg 2006) literature that has come to 
dominate the study of Comparative Political Economy over the last decade. Compara-
tive typologies of capitalisms have become “canonical” among students of the political 
economy of Western societies (Blyth 2003: 215). Pioneered by scholars such as Shon-
field (1965) and popularized by Albert (1991), there are now a large number of compet-
ing typologies to choose from within this field of study (e.g., Crouch/Streeck 1997; Hol-
lingsworth/Boyer 1997; Whitley 1999; Coates 2000; Hall/Soskice 2001a; Amable 2003; 
Schmidt 2003; for a review, see Jackson/Deeg 2006). However, with the exception of a 
few references to South Korea and Taiwan, these typologies have traditionally focused 
on the economies of the triad (but see, e.g., Cernat 2006; Drahokoupil 2009). Moreover, 
they tend to treat national economic systems as closed containers and do not discuss 
their embeddedness within transnational economic regulation and within the institu-
tions of global value chains.
The latter issues are mainly addressed within theories of International Political Econo-
my (IPE). For the purpose of this essay, International Political Economy may be under-
stood as the study of the interplay of policies/politics/polities and economic patterns in 
a cross-border perspective. In comparison to Comparative Political Economy, IPE puts 
a stronger emphasis on non-triad world regions, the global evolution of capitalism and 
global economic institutions. Questions about the evolution and effects of the latter are 
primarily addressed within institutionalist approaches of IPE. However, most of these 
approaches are heavily state-centric and mainly deal with the preference formation of 
governments and their subsequent negotiations about the institutions of global or re-
gional economic governance (e.g., the EU or the WTO). More useful as a complement 
to studying the interplay between domestic capitalism and global/regional economic 
regulation are transnational perspectives within IPE. By “transnational,” we mean the 
systematic incorporation of cross-border influences, both by actors (e.g., multinational 
corporations, global financial market actors) and by institutions (regional and global 
economic regulation) into theories of International Political Economy. The notion of 
“transnational” has been chosen in order to indicate that this cross-border perspective 
is not only concerned with inter-governmental institutions, as in mainstream Inter-
national Relations, but also engages with private actors and institutions (Nölke 2000, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Graz/Nölke 2008a). At the same time, the term “transnational” in-
dicates that not all cross-border interactions have to be global in character, but that 
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these interactions frequently take on a regional dimension. Still, theories of transna-
tional economic governance lack an understanding of the effects that their steering ac-
tivities have on domestic economies and their institutions. Thus, there is much room 
for a research program that studies the interplay between global economic orders and 
national capitalist institutions by utilizing complementary hypotheses derived from 
Comparative Capitalism and transnational institutionalist theories of International Po-
litical Economy.
In order to illustrate this claim, this complementary character will be demonstrated 
in three cases of transnational–domestic interplay: first, the predominant influence of 
(Western) multinational companies during the evolution of Dependent Market Econo-
mies in East Central Europe; second, the implications of the emergence of non-triad 
multinational companies (MNCs) for the reform of global economic institutions; and 
third, the influence of transnational private governance on coordinated economies in 
Western Europe. The selection of these three cases also highlights the uselfulness of 
this combination for an analysis of three of the most interesting world regions – i.e., 
the transitional economies in Eastern Europe, emergent Asia (in particular China and 
India) and (the repercussions of global economic governance on) Europe, particularly 
Germany. Finally, the three case studies cover the relationships between the three spatial 
corners of the global political economy – i.e., triad economies, non-triad economies 
and global institutions. Case discussions will focus on illustrating the complementary 
character of the two approaches discussed above; additional references will be given for 
more comprehensive empirical discussions.
For the purposes of this paper, the Comparative Capitalism perspective will mainly be 
used as a heuristic device for identifying the links between transnational influences 
and domestic institutions, and vice versa. Basic assumptions shared across the various 
branches of the Comparative Capitalism perspective include the following: “that capi-
talism is a socially embedded construction; that models of capitalism are distinguished 
one from the other by their underlying institutional configurations; and that modes 
of capitalist organisation are crucial in determining relative levels of economic perfor-
mance” (Phillips 2004: 9). For this purpose, the most important analytical contribution 
Figure 1 Case selection
Global economic institutions
Transnational 
private governance MNC preferences
Investments in DMEs
Triad economies Non-triad economies
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of the CC perspective is the identification and elaboration of various core institutional 
domains within modern capitalism, including the financial system, corporate gover-
nance, industrial relations, skill creation and the various mechanisms for the transfer 
of innovations throughout a specific capitalist formation (Jackson/Deeg 2006). Only 
for the first illustration, on the determinants of economic development in transitional 
economies, will we use a more specific argument derived from a particular strand of 
CC scholarship, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) perspective (Hall/Soskice 2001a) – 
namely, the argument that complementarities between the various institutional spheres 
are important for the economic performance of specific varieties of capitalism. How-
ever, given this selective utilization of the VoC perspective, we will not address the many 
shortcomings of the VoC approach that have been identified in the literature over the 
last several years, in particular its limited acknowledgement of the social struggles that 
have led to specific institutional outcomes (Streeck/Yamamura 2001; Thelen 2004; Phil-
lips 2004: 10; Crouch 2005: ch. 2; Streeck 2010).
2 Comparative Capitalism and transnational investments:  
Institutional complementarities of dependent market  
economies in East Central Europe2
Recently, we have witnessed a very lively debate on the character of capitalism in East 
Central Europe (ECE) – i.e., Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. From 
a Comparative Capitalism perspective, these countries are increasingly considered to 
be four cases of the same basic variety, sharing very similar socio-economic institu-
tions, while being distinct, for example, from the Baltic states, the CIS (former Soviet 
republics), Romania or Slovenia (Whitley 1999: ch. 8; Cernat 2006; Hancké/Rhodes/
Thatcher 2007b; Drahokoupil 2009). Moreover, a Comparative Capitalism perspective 
has become very attractive for the study of these economies, because neither neoclas-
sical economics nor a transition-path dependency argument is able to account for the 
evolution of this specific capitalist formation. Most existing studies identify parallels 
between these economies and coordinated market economies (CMEs) or liberal mar-
ket economies (LMEs), as depicted within the Varieties of Capitalism paradigm (Hall/
Soskice 2001b). 
Still, can we simply extend the established frameworks in order to make sense of new 
forms of capitalism? From the perspective taken in this paper, the identification of in-
dividual institutional parallels between ECE capitalism and either the CME or the LME 
model is misleading. Instead, we need to focus on the interplay between domestic and 
international factors, in particular on the importance of transnational investments for 
2 This section of the paper draws in part on Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). Please refer to the 
latter for a more detailed version of the argument contained in this section.
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the character of the capitalist formation emerging in East Central Europe. This per-
spective suggests that ECE signifies the emergence of a third basic variety, a dependent 
market economy (DME) type of capitalism. DMEs have comparative advantages in the 
assembly and production of relatively complex and durable consumer goods. These 
comparative advantages are supported by institutional complementarities between 
skilled but cheap labor, the transfer of technological innovations within transnation-
al enterprises and the provision of capital via foreign direct investments. Given these 
complementarities, the superior performance of a DME – if compared, for instance, 
with the rather incoherent “cocktail capitalism” (Cernat 2006) of Romania – becomes 
understandable. 
The point of departure for our combination of hypotheses from International and 
Comparative Political Economy is the recent literature on the relationship between 
transnational corporations and Comparative Capitalism (e.g., Morgan/Kristensen 2006, 
2007). The main conclusion that can be derived from this literature is that transnational 
corporations tend to look for a combination of low labor costs and the acquisition of 
“tacit knowledge embedded in local industrial districts” (Morgan/Whitley 2003: 610). 
As we will demonstrate below, it is the combination of relatively low labor costs and a 
skilled population with a substantial knowledge of a medium level of technology that 
constitutes the attractiveness of this region for MNCs. While transnational corpora-
tions will always strive for an institutional setup that is conducive to their needs, the 
political situation in East Central Europe after 1989 was uniquely well suited to the 
preferences of these corporations, given the absence of strong domestic bourgeoisies in 
the region which could oppose such a development (Eyal/Selenyi/Townsley 1998). On 
the contrary, the ideology of the leading post-transition political class rather fostered 
the development of economic institutions that would cater to the interests of transna-
tional corporations, since it adhered to economic policies that would spur economic 
restructuring and economic growth through foreign investments (Drahokoupil 2008; 
Vliegenthart/Overbeek 2007). Thus, the evolution of dependent market economies is 
not necessarily based on their superior economic performance (as a functionalist ver-
sion of the Comparative Capitalism approach might predict), but rather on the agency 
of MNCs and post-communist economic elites.
In order to make sense of this emergent socio-economic formation, we can identify the 
hierarchy within transnational corporations as the central coordination mechanism in 
DMEs – in contrast to competitive markets as well as formal contracts in LMEs, or in-
ter-firm networks and associations as ideal types in CMEs (see Table 1).3 The notion of 
“hierarchy” not only complements “markets” and “networks” as classical coordination 
institutions of modern societies (Thompson et al. 1991), but is also closely linked to 
the complementarities between the most important socio-economic institutions within 
the DME variety. Following earlier works in the VoC tradition (e.g., Hall/Gingerich 
3 For a similar consideration see the concept of Hierarchical Market Economies as developed by 
Ben Ross Schneider (Schneider/Soskice 2009).
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2004; Höpner 2005), I will take corporate governance (in this case, the hierarchical con-
trol by MNC headquarters) as the focal point of my brief illustration and demonstrate 
its complementarities with the other four major institutions identified within the VoC-
framework. 
Most obvious are the complementarities between corporate governance and the 
primary means for rising investments within DMEs. Given the extremely high volumes 
of FDI (foreign direct investment), transnational corporations prefer to hierarchically 
control local subsidiaries from their headquarters, as an alternative mode of finance 
and governance when compared to LMEs (financing by international capital markets 
and outsider control by dispersed shareholders) and CMEs (financing by domestic 
bank lending as well as internally generated funds and insider control by networks of 
concentrated shareholders). 
Second, there is a close relationship between the corporate governance institutions, 
the primary means of raising investments and the system of industrial relations. On 
the one hand, MNCs need low labor costs for the DME model to work well, and will 
therefore avoid costly institutions such as cumbersome procedures for layoffs. Given 
the heavy competition for FDIs, MNCs have an excellent bargaining position on these 
issues. On the other hand, the integration of corporate decision making into trans-
national commodity chains leads to an interest on the part of the MNCs in keeping 
Table 1 Three varieties of capitalism
Liberal market 
economies
Coordinated market 
economies
Dependent market 
economies
Distinctive coordination 
mechanism
Competitive markets 
and formal contracts
Inter-firm networks and 
associations
Dependence on MNC 
intra-firm hierarchies 
Financial system Domestic and 
international capital 
markets
Domestic bank 
lending and internally 
generated funds
Foreign direct 
investments and foreign-
owned banks
Corporate governance Outsider control: 
dispersed shareholders
Insider control: 
concentrated 
shareholders
Control by headquarters 
of multinational 
enterprises
Industrial relations Pluralist, market-based, 
hardly any collective 
agreements
Corporatist, rather 
consensual, sector-
wide or even national 
agreements
Appeasement of skilled 
labor, company level 
collective agreements
Skill formation General skills, 
high research 
and development 
expenditures
Company- or industry-
specific skills, vocational 
training
Limited expenditures for 
further qualification 
Transfer of innovations Based on markets and 
formal contracts
Important role of joint 
ventures and business 
associations 
Intra-firm transfer within 
transnational enterprise
Comparative advantages Radical innovation in 
technology and service 
sectors
Incremental innovation 
of capital goods
Assembly platforms 
for semi-standardized 
industrial goods
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workers in the distinct subsidiaries fairly satisfied (for a more institutionalist account 
with similar conclusions, see Kahancová 2008). Large-scale labor unrest would not only 
hinder the functioning of the distinct subsidiary, but might also have an impact on 
other parts of the commodity chain. At the same time, we can assume that the position 
of the subsidiaries is not so rooted within the national societies that it would require a 
general arrangement with regard to labor issues. As a result, rather selective company-
level agreements dominate, making it possible to cater to the distinct needs of MNCs 
while creating a stable relationship between management and labor within the indi-
vidual firm.
Third, we observe an intrinsic interconnection between skill formation, the system of 
corporate governance, the primary sources of investments and the innovation system. 
Given that FDI into this variety of capitalism only pays off with relatively low labor 
costs as well as with considerable tax breaks, MNCs are neither in favor of a generous 
public education system nor do they want to invest substantially in their labor force. 
In addition, they do not see the need to invest heavily in skills relevant to innovation, 
given that they prefer to transfer innovations into the region from abroad. Further-
more, the DME’s highly individualized system of company-level industrial relations as 
well as a system of corporate governance that is strongly geared towards the corporate 
hierarchies of individual MNCs would hardly allow for the introduction of a CME-
style system of vocational training institutions, given the national or at least sectoral 
coordination within inter-firm networks and associations that is necessary for effective 
training programs.
Fourth, transnational corporations prefer to keep their most innovative activities at 
their headquarters (or within other regions of the triad that are technologically par-
ticularly competent). Dependent market economies are thus used rather as assembly 
platforms, based on innovations that are made at, or acquired by, MNC headquarters 
and transferred within MNC hierarchies. This again entails complementarities between 
the DME institutions. Financing of investments by FDIs and the hierarchical control by 
MNC headquarters allows for the transfer of innovations to the DMEs without the risk 
of problems with intellectual property rights that would exist, for example, with joint 
ventures. Moreover, given the limited amount of innovative activity, there is neither 
a need for a bold system of general skill education nor for comprehensive vocational 
training, which keeps expenditures for research and development down. The same logic 
of institutional complementarities applies to industrial relations, where the MNCs need 
neither highly flexible labor markets to acquire innovations nor long-term investments 
into skill acquisition based on rather inflexible labor contracts. Instead, DMEs work 
particularly well with a medium level of labor market flexibility, where MNCs retain a 
certain ability to adjust employment levels to demand, but also avoid too much labor 
market fluidity for their skilled staff, in order to avoid a breakdown of their assembly 
platforms.
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Taken together, the complementarities outlined above give rise to a specific type of 
comparative advantages which allow the region to serve as an assembly platform for 
semi-standardized industrial goods. While the highly innovative parts of the business 
cycle remain in the MNC headquarters region, these innovations are transferred to the 
region within transnational companies and remain under the control of the MNC hi-
erarchy. At the same time, the region can at least temporarily take part in the global 
competition for these kinds of investment, based on extremely favorable conditions for 
FDIs (e.g., tax-breaks financed by low public expenditures), moderate labor costs and a 
fairly skilled workforce. A Comparative Capitalism perspective can expose some of the 
institutional foundations of these economies, if we realize that they are heavily influ-
enced by the transnational outlook of multinational companies. However, in contrast 
to the assumption of an institutional equilibrium indicated in some versions of the CC 
framework (e.g., Hall/Soskice 2001b), DMEs are not necessarily stable in the long term, 
due to their dependency on the investment decisions of multinational corporations and 
the threat of a secular erosion of their post-communist skill advantage. 
3 Comparative Capitalism and international conflict: Non-triad  
multinational companies and global economic order4
According to projections made by Goldman Sachs, within the next thirty years Brazil, 
China, Russia, and India will collectively have domestic product and service markets 
larger than those of the triad economies combined (Agtmael 2007: 11). While these 
projections may have to be adjusted for the fallout of the subprime economic crisis, we 
can certainly expect  non-triad economies to play a substantially increased role in the 
decades to come. What are the likely repercussions of this rise of non-triad economies 
on global order? Will this lead to a new North-South conflict, or can we assume that 
these “emerging economies” will support the existing institutions governing the world 
economy?
Given the early stage of this development, there is hardly any direct evidence about the 
likely course of events. Instead, we can take a more indirect approach in order to for-
mulate theoretically grounded expectations. In doing so, we assume that the differences 
between the national business systems of triad and non-triad economies will have an 
effect on their preferences concerning global economic regulation (without claiming 
that this is the only relevant factor for preference formation). Thus, we will use the 
institutional spheres identified by the Comparative Capitalism approach (financial sys-
tem, corporate governance, industrial relations, and the transfer of innovations)5 as a 
4 This section of the paper draws in part on Nölke and Taylor (2010). Please refer to the latter for 
a more detailed version of the argument contained in this section. 
5 We have excluded skill formation from this analysis, since this sphere is less affected by compre-
hensive global regulation.
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heuristic device in order to identify the institutional circumstances and corresponding 
potential preferences of non-triad actors, contrast these preferences with the existing 
global governance institutions and develop some initial ideas about potential future 
conflicts. Given the considerable degree of heterogeneity between the urban and the ru-
ral parts of most non-triad economies, we will focus on the role of the urban scene, and 
in particular on the role of multinational companies emerging from these economies. 
These non-triad multinational companies (NTMNCs) will not only be responsible for 
pushing economic growth within their home countries, but will also play an important 
role in global business regulation in the decades to come.6 What are their preferences 
on issues like corporate governance and corporate finance?
In contrast to most Anglo-Saxon multinationals, most NTMNCs are less dependent on 
international capital markets. Instead, they tend to rely on internally generated funds or 
bank loans. Correspondingly, they are under less pressure to look for short-term share-
holder value. This allows NTMNCs to build up a reserve of slack resources as a finan-
cial cushion in case of unforeseen crises in turbulent markets. Furthermore, NTMNCs 
can frequently make use of some kind of direct or indirect state financing, including 
fiscal incentives, financial guarantees and credits from state-owned banks. This state 
involvement in particular is responsible for the fact that many NTMNCs have access 
to cheaper financing than their competitors (Goldstein 2007: 127). Given the focus 
of most global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the World Trade Organization or the OECD, on the further expansion of Anglo-Saxon 
standards in financial market regulation, we may expect an increasingly intense conflict 
over these issues. We can see evidence of this in the 2000 WTO decision deeming the 
Proex subsidy created by the Brazilian government specifically to support Embraer il-
legal and subsequently forcing the government to abolish the subsidy program. Despite 
this example, for the time being, most of these conflicts are not being played out in the 
open, as demonstrated in the case of accounting regulation, where NTMNCs do not op-
pose the dominant global regulation (e.g., by lobbying within international institutions 
or not adopting dominant rules at all), but instead only selectively implement global 
standards.
Our expectations about corporate financing are closely linked to our interpretation of 
the dominant mode of corporate governance. NTMNCs are not typically dominated 
by dispersed shareholders and the organized forces of global capital markets (mutu-
al funds, pension funds, investment banks, hedge funds, etc.), but instead tend to be 
family-owned or state-controlled. Family and state ownership might even be counted 
among the “distinguishing features” of NTMNCs (Goldstein 2007: 148). The absence of 
an open market for corporate control helps NTMNCs avoid the short-term pressures 
caused by global capital markets. Even if NTMNCs are listed on their home markets’ 
exchanges, in most of these companies, strategic investors (and not dispersed minor-
ity shareholders) play a key role. There are an outstanding number of state-owned and 
6 See Woll (2005) for a similar perspective on Western MNCs.
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state controlled companies in mainland China. This also tends to be the case in nearly 
all natural resource industries, especially those in Russia. Turkey, on the other hand, 
is one of the examples of an NTMNC host country where the ownership structure is 
largely family-based (Aguiar et al. 2006: 8–9). In conclusion, the corporate governance 
of NTMNCs is quite different from that of most Anglo-Saxon multinationals. Moreover, 
different corporate governance rules and behaviours, especially in case of state-owned and 
family-controlled companies, respectively, mean[s] that EMNCs [emerging market multina-
tional companies, the author] may have less trouble and more flexibility in accessing capital 
than listed MNCs that are restricted by the volatile will of shareholders, market regulators, or 
analysts. (Goldstein 2007: 146)
In a similar vein, numerous Asian NTMNCs are supported by interpersonal networks, 
which are in particularly based on ethnic ties; these networks reduce information costs 
through the provision of trust and other forms of (social) capital. Among the most 
well-known of these networks are the Chaebol in South Korea and the Guanxi Chixe in 
Taiwan (Feenstra/Hamilton 2006).
Corporate governance issues are not regulated by a powerful global regime such as, for 
example, the World Trade Organization. Instead, these issues are quite loosely institu-
tionalized. Most regulations are in the form of voluntary codes, such as those issued by 
the OECD and numerous other private bodies. Much like the reactions we have seen 
in the field of corporate finance, we can expect participants in global corporate gov-
ernance debates to express opposition to instituting a preponderance of Anglo-Saxon 
standards driven by the financial markets, since this might clash with the interests of 
strategic investors, the state or the founding families governing the NTMNCs. However, 
the debate might become more complex due to the recent wave of Western concerns 
about the increasing influence of non-triad sovereign wealth funds. NTMNCs prefer 
less restrictive takeover regulations given that they have increasingly relied on invest-
ments in brownfield sites (previously used industrial or commercial sites) in the triad to 
acquire market access, higher profit margins and brand recognition. Nevertheless, some 
triad governments are becoming more wary of market-friendly standards and have 
started introducing institutions that protect against takeovers by non-triad state funds. 
Correspondingly, we can expect to see increasing tensions and the growing importance 
of institutions such as the Council on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
The International Business literature that dominates the debate on NTMNCs has not 
given much attention to industrial relations. However, among the information that is 
available, we should highlight the weak role of organized labor – e.g., leading to compar-
atively low levels of payment and long working hours. In general, there is a rather high 
degree of flexibility on the part of workers, enabling fairly flexible production based on 
reliance on human capital rather than machinery, which complements the fact that the 
majority of non-triad economies have an overabundance of human capital. A low-cost 
workforce not only benefits Chinese NTMNCs that base their business model on price 
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competition in mature industries, but also Korean and Taiwanese NTMNCs that have 
made extensive use of low labor costs elsewhere in the region (Goldstein 2007: 76–78). 
In the field of industrial relations, NTMNCs are usually unwilling to accept compre-
hensive global labor regulation by the ILO because of the corresponding threat to the 
low (labor) cost strategy that has helped them to expand. Furthermore, we witness 
increasing tensions with OECD unions when companies are taken over and local in-
dustrial relations models are not respected. One example that has further exacerbated 
these tensions is the case of Taiwan’s Benq, which in 2005 acquired the handset unit 
of Siemens (Germany) and subsequently closed the subsidiary in 2006. After enough 
time had passed to leverage all the resources the subsidiary possessed, bankruptcy was 
declared, and it was done so directly after all the contracts of the roughly 6,000 workers 
they inherited had expired. Finally, in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
as well, NTMNCs are usually less willing to accept stringent (self-)regulation. However, 
NTMNCs might assume more corporate social responsibility in the medium term if 
they participate more strongly in global value chains or are directly confronted with 
(CSR-conscious) Western customers.
The latecomer status of NTMNCs is responsible for their strong focus on inter-firm 
cooperation (partnerships, joint ventures) for the spread of innovations, since these 
networks provide a crucial mode for the acquisition of technology. In a later stage of 
development, NTMNCs use acquisitions – in particular in the triad regions – in order 
to improve their innovative capacity. NTMNCs buy companies in the triad in order to 
acquire technologies or intangible assets, such as the ability to manage companies in a 
less regulated environment. Again, NTMNC strategies are supported by specific pub-
lic policies, including a “soft patent system to legalize reverse engineering” (Goldstein 
2007: 95) and a rather generous version of competition policy. Although there is some 
variance between non-triad countries, most use competition policies to support NT-
MNCs, by creating “national champions” and supporting the consolidation of industries.
Two global regulatory issue areas are relevant for the innovation activities of NTMNCs: 
intellectual property rights (IPR) and competition policy. In terms of intellectual prop-
erty rights, as regulated by the World Trade Organization, the activities have resulted 
in coercing non-triad markets to prematurely embed strict(er) IPR regulation legisla-
tively, prior to normative acceptance. Given that many of the current NTMNCs have 
been enabled to flourish through lax IPR regulation, this will likely remain an area that 
non-triad governments will contest. The mere fact that IPR legislation is often very 
minimally enforced by non-triad governments (Braithwaite 2000; May 2007; Sell 1998, 
2003) is further evidence for this. At the firm level, many NTMNCs are against strict(er) 
IPR regulations which may inhibit cross-border learning. Nevertheless, as more NT-
MNCs become involved in industries that thrive on strict(er) IPR regulation, significant 
contestation may arise not only among NTMNCs, but also between these big compa-
nies and small indigenous firms in their domestic markets. The former situation refers 
to conflicts between those wanting strict(er) IPR legislation versus those against it, an 
issue which will be heavily conditioned by the degree to which NTMNCs continue to 
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move up the global value chain. With regard to the latter constellation, given that un-
even economic development in non-triad markets is one direct result of the state focus-
ing on producing growth in two to three extremely key industries while often “neglect-
ing” to support growth in many other industries, if and when the key industries become 
more interested in protective IPR regulation in their domestic markets, this may have a 
significant backlash on other domestic industries and on attempts to achieve uniform 
national economic development as a whole.
Competition policy is not yet regulated by a powerful global regime, but there is a 
strong increase in activities aimed at institutionalizing it more thoroughly worldwide, 
such as an increasingly dense interaction between EU and US competition authorities, 
the transfer of competition policies and institutions into the national framework of 
countries outside of the triad, and the inclusion of competition policy in bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements. In general, we can assume that most NTMNCs prefer 
less restrictive policies for two reasons: foremost, so as not to impede inter-firm link-
ages that allow for the transfer of innovation, but more importantly so as not to choke 
government protection of national champions. Recently, however, the North-South di-
viding line has become less clear-cut, as evidenced by Chinese musings about the poten-
tial conflict of a takeover in the iron ore sector with competition laws.
In conclusion, our extrapolation (from a CC perspective) of how potential North-South 
conflicts are being played out within global governance has not yet led to a clear picture. 
While I have noted numerous areas where we can expect intensified conflict in the near 
future, there are other areas where I assume that the preferences of triad and non-triad 
multinationals may gradually converge. Indeed, in several cases NTMNCs appear to 
take on similar preferences to those of triad MNCs over time. I have also noted some 
similarities between NTMNCs and companies in coordinated economies – e.g., in the 
fields of corporate governance and corporate finance. However, I have also identified a 
number of cases where NTMNCs might clash with global governance institutions, in 
particular due to the affinity of the latter with Anglo-Saxon models. Moreover, most 
NTMNCs operate in far closer collaboration with national governments than triad 
MNCs do, thus indicating the potential push for a more mercantilist form of global eco-
nomic order that may be one of the most visible conflicts to arise in the future. Which 
of these trajectories will gain the upper hand in the end is difficult to say at the moment: 
much more research on NTMNCs and their position towards global economic order is 
needed. While this section has not yet provided firm answers, it has presented strategies 
for developing these answers in the future.
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4 Comparative Capitalism and transnational private governance:   
Law firms, EU competition policy and effects on innovation  
transfer in coordinated economies7
Transnational private governance is a “hot” topic in International Relations (IR), propa-
gated as an alternative mode of governance if compared with old-style intergovernmen-
tal regulation in the form of international organizations and regimes such as the World 
Trade Organization. During the last decade, we have learned a lot about the workings of 
private governance in international affairs (Cutler/Haufler/Porter 1999; Hall/Biersteker 
2002; Graz/Nölke 2008a), in particular with regard to its antecedents and its mecha-
nisms. Still, the economic consequences of this rather novel type of regulatory insti-
tution have not received much attention so far. If covered at all, the most important 
concerns have been the implications of transnational private governance for national 
sovereignty and democratic accountability. Evaluating the socio-economic consequenc-
es of private rulemaking at the transnational level, by contrast, remains a difficult task. 
Most theoretical frameworks within International Relations are too state-centric to ad-
dress these questions: they predominantly focus on public policies. Furthermore, the 
focus of concepts within International Relations is usually on the mode of governance 
(i.e., public versus private, national versus international) and much less on its content 
(e.g., neo-liberal versus social-democratic). This is where the complementary perspec-
tive of Comparative Capitalism comes in. The CC approach is particularly well suited 
to assessing the economic consequences of an increasing prominence of transnational 
private governance, given that it is deliberately based on a firm-centric conception of 
political economy, in contrast to the government-centric approaches that dominate the 
field in IPE. Based on a combination of insights derived from Comparative Capitalism 
and institutionalist International Political Economy, we can argue that many prominent 
cases of private governance in international affairs are strongly affiliated with liberal 
models, based on the powerful role of Anglo-Saxon coordination service firms, and cor-
respondingly work in opposition to more coordinated economies. In order to illustrate 
this claim, I will present a case study on the influence of Anglo-Saxon coordination 
service firms on core economic institutions within coordinated economies, namely that 
of transnational law firms on the erosion of traditional forms of innovation transfer in 
the context of EU competition policy. From a Comparative Capitalism perspective, the 
traditional EU system of competition policy was very much in line with institutions 
of coordinated capitalism, whereas the recent shift has introduced major elements of 
the US model. A crucial ingredient of this recent shift is the empowerment of Anglo-
Saxon law firms that play an important role in the private enforcement of competition 
policy within the US. In order to evaluate the implications of this shift towards private 
governance, we will look both at the traditional principles and at the enforcement of 
German/EU and US competition policies before turning to the recent reform.
7 This section of the paper draws in part on Wigger and Nölke (2007). Please refer to the latter for 
a more detailed version of the argument contained in this section.
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During the last several decades, the maxims of the Chicago School have had a strong 
influence on the US antitrust system (see also Wigger 2008). According to this para-
digm’s central tenet, the ultimate determining factor for assessing anticompetitive con-
duct should be consumer welfare maximization, underpinned by rigorous economic 
modeling based on neoclassical price theory (Fox 1997: 340). Consequently, the focal 
point of competition control should not be the concentration of market power as such, 
but rather collusive agreements with clear negative effects on consumer welfare, cartels 
and other restrictive business practices. Long-term economic concerns, such as the dif-
fusion of technological innovation through inter-firm collaboration, do not play an 
important role in the US variety of competition control (Hall/Soskice 2001b: 31).
Conversely, in the German coordinated market economy, some forms of inter-firm col-
laboration may be acceptable (or even desirable), particularly if they serve the diffu-
sion of technology within the economy (Hall/Soskice 2001b: 26). Individual companies 
cannot shoulder the development of new technologies on their own – thus we need to 
separate useful technology cooperation from harmful anticompetitive conduct. This 
multi-goal orientation provides a normative framework for a balanced interventionist 
strategy in the administration of anticompetitive conduct. Although the overall influ-
ence of German ordoliberal scholars in other economic regulatory policies has waned 
since the 1960s, it continued to have a remarkable stronghold in EU competition policy 
for several decades (cf. Budzinski 2003; Hölscher/Stephan 2004).
Not only do the basic guidelines governing competition law differ considerably between 
the traditional German and the recent US models, but enforcement practices do as well. 
Competition law enforcement in the US is a case-orientated endeavor in which courts 
constitute the ultimate resort for stopping anticompetitive conduct (see Wigger 2007, 
2008). The enforcement agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department 
of Justice, cannot block anticompetitive conduct by themselves. Just like private plain-
tiffs, they have to litigate all cases before the courts. However, more than 90 percent 
of all formal US antitrust actions are brought to the courts by private litigators (Wils 
2003: 477). The strong role of private enforcement in antitrust prosecution is due to a 
range of systemic features in the US model that make it particularly attractive to initi-
ate legal proceedings against corporations, such as damage compensation, class actions, 
contingency fees, criminal prosecution and leniency schemes. A successful plaintiff in 
the US can be awarded not only the costs of suing (expert fees and attorney’s fees), 
but up to three times the damage suffered (treble damages). Moreover, plaintiffs can 
group together and sue collectively (class actions), and professional litigators may of-
fer contingency fees or sell their legal services under a “no-cure-no-pay” condition. In 
combination with criminal sanctions (imprisonment of CEOs) and leniency schemes 
(immunity from prosecution to those who first confess to having participated in a col-
lusive agreement), there is much incentive to bring antitrust infringements to the US 
courts. The basic objectives of competition policy and the mode of enforcement are 
closely intertwined. The focus on only one decisional criterion upon which anticom-
petitive conduct is judged follows necessarily from the litigation-oriented approach – 
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otherwise the discretionary power of the courts would be too great. Correspondingly, 
there is no place for broader concerns, neither in policy paradigms, nor during their 
enforcement through private litigants who are primarily motivated by short-term prof-
its (Wigger 2007).
In Continental Europe, specialized competition authorities, rather than courts, are the 
main decision-makers. Competition authorities tend to be equipped with far-reaching 
discretionary powers when addressing and administering anticompetitive business 
conduct. Regimes of ex ante authorization, according to which corporate actors notify 
competition authorities of planned agreements, are common not only for mergers, but 
also for commercial agreements. Courts are merely involved in case corporate actors 
appeal the decisions taken by competition authorities (Wigger 2008). Again, competi-
tion policy principles and the mode of their enforcement are closely interrelated with 
the basic institutions of coordinated economies. Of crucial importance is the institu-
tionalization of powerful public enforcement agencies with wide-ranging competencies. 
Only public agencies, and not courts, can be trusted to balance the multiple goals of 
antitrust policies, including promoting the transfer of innovations through inter-firm 
collaboration.
Against this background, the 2004 reform of EU antitrust regulation and enforcement 
was the most radical shift in the history of European competition policy. It came in the 
form of a package of both substantial and procedural changes. In terms of substance, 
rigorous economic analyses underpin the assessments of restrictive business practices 
(e.g., extensive empirical and econometric assessments of product markets and market 
shares, simulation models and price calculations, damage analyses). Procedurally, one 
of the core components was the elimination of the long-standing administrative noti-
fication regime under which companies could be assured in advance by the European 
Commission that a planned commercial agreement did not fall into the category of a 
cartel or other business practices prohibited under Article 81 (TEC). In contrast, com-
panies now have to assess for themselves whether a planned deal infringes on the law or 
not. Thus, the new regime introduces greater reliance on private “market intelligence” 
in spotting anticompetitive practices, usually based on expert advice by transnational 
law firms. Although the reform itself did not touch upon national enforcement prac-
tices, the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon common law competition enforcement model 
has been driven a step further by the introduction of stronger incentives for private 
plaintiffs to litigate within domestic law (Wigger 2009). This can have considerable 
repercussions upon the transfer of innovations via inter-firm collaboration. A much 
noted case is that of the ongoing investigation of German sausage producers by the 
German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office). After one of the producers made 
use of a leniency scheme in order to avoid prosecution, other producers terminated the 
inter-company cooperation on skill acquisition and innovation.8
8 “Razzia bei Wurstherstellern,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 June 2009; “Kartellverfahren versetzt 
Wurstbranche in Aufruhr,” Westfalen-Blatt, 22 September 2010.
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In sum, we can observe that institutions that are strongly interlinked with the liberal 
model are being transplanted into coordinated economies by means of transnational 
private governance; this is particularly salient within the European Union. Further ex-
amples include accounting standards (Perry/Nölke 2006) and rating agencies (Nölke/
Perry 2007). The privatization of certain facets of business regulation has gained 
ground through a depoliticized, professions-based interest constellation that disregards 
more eminent political features of this form of economic organization (Dewing/Russell 
2004: 300). It should not surprise us that attempts by the EU to introduce Anglo-Saxon 
standards through new public regulations, such as the European Works Council Direc-
tive, the European Company Statute Directive and the 13th Takeover Directive, have 
led to somewhat uneasy compromises, given the high visibility of these issues and the 
corresponding political controversy (Cernat 2004; Callaghan 2008). By contrast, the 
transfer of competencies to private regulation that we have discussed in this section 
has led to a clear decision in favor of the Anglo-Saxon model. While more explicit po-
litical attacks on the basic institutions of Rhenish capitalism are not (yet) feasible, the 
enhanced role of private actors in EU regulation provides an excellent opportunity for 
the erosion of these institutions “through the backdoor.” Similar strategies have been 
identified for the utilization of soft law (Schäfer 2006) and of the European Court of 
Justice (Höpner 2008).
5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that questions about the interplay between national capi-
talist institutions and transnational economic governance can be usefully addressed 
by deriving complementary theoretical arguments from Comparative Capitalism and 
International Political Economy (IPE). More specifically, the suggestion was to combine 
the study of Comparative Capitalism with a transnational institutionalist IPE perspec-
tive. Although the Comparative Capitalism approach may be somewhat exhausted (and 
is increasingly being criticized) as far as its applications for the study of the compara-
tive political economies of triad societies are concerned (Jackson/Deeg 2006: 37–39; 
Hancké/Rhodes/Thatcher 2007b: 4–9; Streeck 2010), it can still be put to some pro-
ductive use for these particular questions if combined with hypotheses derived from 
International Political Economy. However, Comparative Capitalism and theories about 
transnational economic institutions are normally discussed within very different aca-
demic communities, and mutually complementary insights – e.g., the formatting ef-
fects of multinational companies on dependent capitalism in ECE (Section 2), the pro-
spective transformative power of non-triad varieties of capitalism on global economic 
institutions (Section 3), or the eroding pressures caused by transnational private gover-
nance on coordinated capitalism (Section 4) – are hardly realized.
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These shortcomings mirror the more general separation between Comparative Politi-
cal Economy/CPE and International Political Economy/IPE that has evolved over the 
last three to four decades (Phillips 2004; Graz/Nölke 2008b). Whereas classical politi-
cal economy was unified by some key discourses (e.g., on the nature of capitalism), 
the emergence of IPE as a separate (sub-)discipline, as well as the crystallization of 
the Comparative Capitalism (CC) approach have further separated two camps divided 
with reference to their respective levels of analysis and with increasingly divergent re-
search interests. Whereas IPE is more interested in “the webs of structural power op-
erating throughout the world system than in comparative analysis of discrete parts of 
it, bounded by territorial frontiers dividing states” (Strange 1997: 182–183), the CC 
approach is focused on “the conceptual frameworks used to understand institutional 
variation across nations” (Hall/Soskice 2001b: 1). This separation is quite unproductive, 
given that both fields are concerned with the same subjects – that is, “with the intersec-
tions of economic and political dimensions of social organisation, with capitalism, with 
processes and models of development broadly conceived” (Phillips 2004: 6) – and that 
both are restricted in their understanding of these subjects if operating on their own:
An understanding of domestic political economy requires an understanding of its location and 
mode of insertion within wider regional and global political economies; an understanding of 
processes in the global political economy demands an understanding of the ways in which they 
are intrinsically and fundamentally constituted by national states, state strategies and structures 
of social relations, and of the processes of change they unleash in distinctive national and re-
gional contexts. (ibid.) 
It is easy to claim that hypotheses derived from CPE and IPE should be re-combined in 
order to address questions of common concern, but it is rarely done in practice: “The 
cases for ‘grounding’ the study of International Political Economy in solid comparative 
analysis, and for ‘contextualising’ the study of Comparative Political Economy in analy-
sis of global structural trends, are more often made than the projects undertaken. Yet 
their achievement is essential for understanding the contemporary political economy of 
development across the regions of the world, and indeed the world order in which they 
are embedded” (Phillips 2004: 2). In order to avoid this pitfall and to make this claim 
more specific, we have presented three short sample applications, which demonstrate 
the complementary perspectives pursued by Comparative Capitalism and transnation-
al institutionalist approaches in International Political Economy.
A perspective that combines hypotheses derived from Comparative Capitalism and 
from institutionalist International Political Economy is particularly important when 
we talk about capitalism in non-triad settings. Here, capitalism developed later than 
in the West, within a different stage in the development of capitalism – in particular, 
during its more intensive integration into the world economy, as indicated by much 
stronger penetration by multinational corporations and much more powerful molding 
by international institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organization), thereby leading to quite different state-economy 
relationships (Coates 2000: 226–227; Phillips 2004: 10–13). These developments pose 
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a particular challenge for the study of Comparative Capitalism, but also indicate an in-
teresting avenue for further research. After all, the concerns of the contemporary Com-
parative Capitalism debate and important strands of development theory are strikingly 
similar (Phillips 2004: 16). And while there is an understandable ennui among scholars 
regarding CC’s preoccupation with economic performance within the triad, economic 
growth still is a matter of life and death outside of this world region. It is thus no sur-
prise that the case for recombining CPE and IPE mainly comes from scholars concerned 
with non-triad settings (Phillips 2004), echoing earlier calls by scholars working on the 
political economy of small states in Europe (Katzenstein 1985, 2003).
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